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Comment on Hubert Marraud’s “Deliberation And Collective Identity
Formation”
JEFF NOONAN
Department of Philosophy
University of Windsor
jnoonan@uwindsor.ca

Deliberation is an argumentation practice undertaken by groups trying to make collectively
binding decisions. Marraud’s paper explores the formal structure of deliberation in contrast to
related forms of argument (like negotiation). He contends that unlike negotiations, deliberations
are essentially public and occur only between people who share a collective identity. Indeed, if
Marraud is correct, collective identity is generated through and strengthened by deliberative
practices. His conclusions are well supported. I agree that deliberation is a distinctive feature of
the ways in which members of groups argue and that it depends upon group membership and
commitment to some sort of collective project. The three questions that the paper provoked in
me are not directed at the formal analysis of deliberation or the connection established between
deliberation and collective agency. Rather, they are substantive and political.
I approach the issues the paper raises as a social philosopher and not an argumentation
theorist. While non-political groups can deliberate, I think that deliberation is a political form of
argument par excellence, and Marraud would seem to agree (p.1). Thus, although I come at these
issues as social philosopher with Habermas and critics of Habermas like I.M. Young and Mouffe
foremost in my in mind, I hope there can still be a productive exchange of ideas. Nevertheless, I
must acknowledge a worry: when approaching a paper from a different philosophical perspective
there is always the danger of talking past it. I fear that my comments might fall victim to this
danger. I will try to minimize it by noting that I do not regard the comments as critical of the
argument, but as a contribution to the wider exploration of the general problem on which the
paper is focused: deliberation as a means of arriving at collectively binding decisions. I hope
these comments broaden the conversation rather than substitute for the author’s approach.
With that said, the paper raised three questions for me:
1) Is the paper a step towards a normative theory of how we ought to argue when we argue
politically, or a description of the underlying grammar of actual deliberations, or both? If
it is a description (which seems unlikely) it suffers from an overly optimistic
understanding of how political debate actually proceeds. So I suspect that we are being
offered a normative theory of how we ought to argue when our goal is to convince other
members of a group how we ought to proceed. However, if this is an argument of how
we ought to argue when we deliberate politically, it overlooks a crucial difference
between arguments about what is good or bad in general, and what is good and bad in
political life. Political arguments cannot seem to escape from partisanship and power.
Hence, a “good reason” in politics can differ radically from a good reason generally. If I
am a committed Republican, I share a general interest in keeping the party in power.
That which keeps the party in power is good for the party, and the group interest is
identified with this partisan goal. Some of what we agree to in the service of that goal
might not be good on other, more objective criteria (cutting taxes weakens public
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institutions which, as the Covid-19 crisis illustrates, we need). Thus my question (to
rephrase it somewhat) is: how does a theory of argumentation understand the difference
between objectively good reasons and politically good reasons, when there is a conflict
between the two? The author is committed to deliberation as a form of argument that
leads to the “best available decision,” but in politics the best available decision
objectively speaking might not be recognized as the best available decision to keep one’s
side in power. (p. 4-5)
2) This problem leads directly to my second question: How does the author understand
politics (or perhaps better, following the work of Chantal Mouffe), the relationship
between politics as the exchange of reasons and the political as an “agonistic” struggle
over power. If the civic body contains different groups and parties who fundamentally
disagree with one another, and if consensus is not possible, (pp. 6-7,14) then is
deliberation ultimately powerless to resolve these deep disagreements? Deliberation
would appear to be a (normative) alternative to power politics, but it would seem only
able to succeed if people put a very general common interest (as “Canadians” or even
more deeply “human beings”) before allegiance to a more restricted group or party. If
they cannot, then we will be thrown back to the problem above: people conflate a “good”
reason with a good reason for my party, and deliberation would fail to move us towards
the best option, all things considered. Does it therefore follow that the political is
essentially a field of contestation over power and that truth (following Foucault) is
always bound up with the power to define and decide? I would assume that
argumentation theory is normatively oriented (like Habermas and others’ “deliberative
democracy”) by a horizon of non-partisan truth, but what argument can motivate a nonpartisan conception of truth in hyper-partisan political spaces?
3) This question leads to my final question, which is simply (but it is far from a simple
question!) what is the role of “truth” in deliberation? The paper seems to support the
position that deliberation does not lead to the one right answer, but if not, how do we
distinguish the better and the worse, especially in light of the partisanship typical or
politics. Take global warming. The scientific evidence seems all but certain, yet political
systems across the world fail to arrive at policies that can address the underlying
problem. Let us assume that these politicians are engaged in serious deliberations, and
yet they fail to arrive at agreement on solutions to a crisis that threatens us all as human
beings. Does that failure reveal a deeper problem with deliberation: it produces
agreement, but it does not necessarily produce agreements about the truth i.e., verifiable
statements about that which is objectively the case and which we must take into account
if we are to govern ourselves rationally?

2

